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Clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They
have nothing to sell but personal service. An attempt, therefore, to
barter in clients would appear to be inconsistent with the best con-
cepts of our professional status.1
I. INTRODUCTION
D URING the early fourteenth century, it was not uncommon for
masters to physically threaten departing servants so as to pre-
vent them from leaving to work for a competitor. This early coun-
terpart to noncompetition clauses likely served a useful function in
medieval times. Today, however, the barbaric nature of such an act
would be unreasonable at best.
Over the last fifteen years, two divergent common law views
have emerged regarding the enforceability of noncompetition
1. New York County Lawyer's Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 109
(1943); see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (stating
that restrictive covenants in attorney contracts were unethical despite lack of ex-
press prohibition in Canons of Ethics). ABA Formal Opinion 300 states:
[A] general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving the
employment from practicing in the community for a stated period, ap-
pears to this Committee to be an unwarranted restriction on the right of
a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent with our pro-
fessional status. Accordingly, the Committee is of the opinion it would be
improper for the employing lawyer to require the covenant and likewise
for the employed lawyer to agree to it.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) (DR 2-108(A)) of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility codified the reasoning of Formal Opinion 300. 58 U.S.L.W. 2379
(Jan. 9, 1990). DR 2-108 states:
A. A lawyer shall not be party to or participate in a partnership or em-
ployment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a law-
yer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the
agreement, except as a condition to the payment of retirement benefits.
B. In connection with a settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall
not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 2-108 (1969). In 1983, the
American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, adopting a similar provision in Model Rule 5.6. Model Rule 5.6 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agree-
ment concerning benefits upon retirement; or,
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice
is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 5.6 (1983).
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clauses between attorneys. The first view is exemplified by two Ore-
gon appellate court cases2 and the landmark New York Court of
Appeals' decision, Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord,3 whereby noncompeti-
tion clauses between attorneys were found void as against public
policy.4 The second view adopts a contrary position, questioning
2. See Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d 563, 569 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) (characterizing DR 2-108(A) as "[a] flat prohibition against an attorney en-
tering a non-competition agreement if the attorney intends to remain in prac-
tice"); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing trial
court and holding that noncompetition clause violates public policy). In Gray, the
court invoked DR 2-108 to void a provision in a partnership agreement that with-
held benefits from withdrawing partners who continued to practice law within a
specified geographical area. Gray, 663 P.2d at 1290. The court refused to charac-
terize the agreement as a condition to payment of retirement benefits. Id. The
court stated: "If retirement has the same meaning as withdrawal in DR 2-108(A),
then the disciplinary rule has no meaning. Every termination of a relationship
between law partners would be a retirement, and agreements restricting the right
to practice would always be allowed." Id.; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILrry DR 2-108(A) (providing narrow exception for agreements that restrict
lawyer's right to practice as condition for payment of retirement benefits).
3. 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989). Parties to a partnership agreement may gener-
ally make any agreement they wish concerning the dissolution of the partnership
or the withdrawal of a partner. Id. at 414. The terms of such agreements, however,
must not contravene public policy. Id. at 413; cf. Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (holding agreement providing for division of clients
upon dissolution of partnership void as against public policy), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208
(App. Div. 1975).
4. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 163 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing) (recognizing that most jurisdictions addressing restrictive covenants and cove-
nants not to compete between lawyers have found them unenforceable as violative
of professional codes of ethics); see also Kelly v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 1306, 1313 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing general unenforceability of covenants that restrict law-
yer's right to practice), vacated on other grounds, 611 N.E.2d 118 (1993); Anderson v.
Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990)
("detriment" clause in partnership agreement was impermissible restriction on
lawyer's right to practice); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass.
1989) (citing Hagen and Gray in interpreting provision in partnership agreement
as consistent with Canons of Ethics); Duyer, 336 A.2d at 500 (acknowledging that
lawyer restrictions injure public and finding commercial standards inapplicable);
Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991) (find-
ing forfeiture-for-competition provision violation of public policy); Cohen v. Gra-
ham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1390-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming arbitration
agreement that covenant not to compete violated public policy); see Vincent R.
Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fi-
duciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 111 (1988) (stating that
contractual terms attempting to avoid disputes over solicitation of firm clients
"would likely run afoul of the ethical standards against non-competition agree-
ments"); see also Gail Diane Cox, Defect at Your Own Risk, NAT'L ULj., Oct. 14, 1991,
at 1, col. 2 (discussing validity of noncompetition clauses in partnership agree-
ments). But see Howard, 863 P.2d at 160 (enforcing agreement that "plac[ed] a
reasonable price on competition").
Some commentators have argued for the enforceability of agreements that
penalize but do not prohibit competition with a former firm. See Serena L. Kafker,
Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership
Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 36-42 (1993)
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the conventional wisdom that those who seek legal advice must be
afforded the broadest possible choice of counsel.5 Specifically,
these opinions challenge the idea that noncompetition clauses are
"relic[s], found to be unenforceable." 6  This Article analyzes the
relevant ethical mandates and the history of postemployment re-
strictive covenants between lawyers. In so doing, this Article raises
and answers questions concerning the traditional position taken by
lawyers. First, Part II examines the conflicts that increasingly occur
when attorneys depart their firms.7 Part III discusses the evolution
and ethical rationale underlying the traditional, per se impermissi-
bility of noncompetition clauses between lawyers.8 Next, Part IV ac-
knowledges the unique position of lawyers in the public sphere and
thejudiciary's use of a reasonableness standard, rather than a com-
mercial standard, to evaluate attorney restrictive covenants.9 Part V
examines the Cohen decision, while Part VI analyzes the recent judi-
cial trend in upholding postemployment covenants. 10 Part VII then
discusses the balancing test currently used to reject the per se im-
("A reasonable forfeiture clause would not impose an absolute restriction and
would protect the dominant interest of the client as well as those of the departing
partner and firm."); Glenn S. Draper, Comment, Enforcing Lauyers' Covenants Not to
Compete, 69 WASH. L. REv. 161, 171 (1994) (arguing for abandonment of per se
unenforceable approach to restrictive covenants between lawyers).
5. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
6. Cox, supra note 4, at 1, col.2. A "reasonable" restrictive covenant that may
be enforceable in a commercial setting or between non-lawyers is analyzed differ-
ently when between lawyers. This difference stems from the ethical standards
prohibiting lawyers from restricting other lawyers' rights to practice law. SeeJacob
v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 147 (N.J. 1992) (recognizing that
ABA ethical opinions of 1960s "set stage" for contemporary rules prohibiting re-
strictive covenants among attorneys); see also Duyer, 336 A.2d at 499 ("A lawyer's
clients are neither chattels nor merchandise, and his practice and good will may
not be offered for sale.") (citing HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 189 (1953)); cf
Michael G. Getty, Enforceability of Noncompetition Covenants in Physician Employment
Contracts, 7J. LEGAL MED. 235, 250-53 (1986) (discussing public interest in context
of postemployment covenants among physicians).
7. For cases and examples of the conflicts that arise when attorneys leave their
firms, see infra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
8. For a complete discussion of the evolution of the per se rule against post-
employment restrictive covenants among attorneys, see infra notes 29-77 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the approach taken by the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility, see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
9. For coverage of the unique position occupied by lawyers in society and the
resulting standards applied, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
10. For complete coverage of the Cohen decision, see infra notes 99-115 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the court decisions in the 1990s that up-
held the enforceability of postemployment restrictive covenants between attorneys,
see infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text.
1994] AN ATroRNEY's DIEMMA 777
permissibility of noncompetition clauses between lawyers. 1 ' Part
VIII discusses the adverse impact resulting from the application of
the balancing test.12 Finally, in Part IX, this Article concludes that
the legal profession is inherently different from any other profes-
sion, mandating that attorney noncompetition clauses be treated
differently in order to protect the best interests of the client.'3
II. STATE OF THE MARKET
"Partners in law firms have become increasingly 'mobile,' feel-
ing much freer than they formerly did and having much greater
opportunity than they formerly did, to shift from one firm to an-
other .... ,14 These departures, often described as "split-offs,"' 5
"break-ups"16 and "lateral hires,"17 likely generate disputes between
the exiting partner and his or her former law firm.' 8 The particu-
11. For an analysis of the application of the balancing test, see infra notes 164-
82 and accompanying text.
12. For an analysis of the adverse effects resulting from application of the
balancing test, see infra notes 183-209 and accompanying text.
13. For this Article's conclusion, see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
14. William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152
(1986); see alsoJohnson, supra note 4, at 4-6 nn.2-4 (discussing structural changes
in legal environment and lawyers' increased mobility); The Roads Taken, HARv. LAw
ScLn. BuLL., No. 3, at 15 (1986) ("Law is a very mobile profession .... The road
not taken is not gone forever .... [T]oday's graduates are likely to revise their
choices along the way.").
15. See Doug Lavine, Who Corrals Clients When Law Firms Split?, NAT'L LJ., Apr.
30, 1979, at 8 (defining "split-offs"); see alsoJohnson, supra note 4, at 6 n.8 ("The
events and reasons giving rise to termination of attorney's employment are
myriad.").
16. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing sweep-
ing changes in practice of law); Johnson, supra note 4, at 6 (labeling attorney de-
parture as "break-up"); see also Eleanor Kerlow, Messy Breakup Takes Nasty Turn,
LEGAL TIMES, June 13, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (describing departure as "break-up"). See
generally Laurle S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm
Breakups, 61 TEMPLE L. Rv. 1055, 1117-22 (1988) (examining ethical conse-
quences of law firm "break-ups"). Recently, headlines have chronicled the increas-
ing incidence of lawyers departing their firms to join competing firms or start their
own firms. Id. at 1056.
17. See ROBERT W. HaNu , LAW Fia BREAKuPs (1990).
Law firms are under siege. The traditional view of the law firm as a stable
institution with an assured future is now challenged by an awareness that
even the largest and most prestigious firms are fragile economic units
facing a myriad of risks in their quests to survive and prosper. No longer
can the graduate join a major firm with the sanguine assumption that the
firm will not experience major upheavals, turnovers in lawyers, or, in ex-
treme cases, receivership.
Id. § 1.1, at 1; see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 6 (using term "lateral hire" to
describe partnership departures); Rita HenleyJensen, The Urge to Merge Isn't Gone,
NAT'L . Aug. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (discussing "lateral hiring").
18. Such disputes may precipitate lawsuits filed by departing attorneys against
their former firms or remaining partners. E.g., Howard, 863 P.2d at 152 (withdraw-
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larities of many of these departures make for interesting reading.
For example, in one case a departing partner came to his firm on
Thanksgiving weekend with a suitcase to remove client files.' 9 In
another case, a lawyer physically assaulted a departing partner and
threw him out of the office.20 Similar examples abound: Attorneys
tortiously interfered with their former firm's contractual obliga-
tions and falsely represented to clients that the firm had split up;2 1'
a lawyer falsely told his clients he was still associated with his former
firm; 22 a personality conflict between a partner's son and the re-
maining partners resulted in the breakup of a nationally known law
firm;23 a lawyer intentionally changed the filing cabinet locks to
prevent other partners from accessing the files;2 4 lawyers carted
away over 2000 client files late at night;25 and a partner informed
ing partner brought action against remaining partners for accounting, damages
and declaration of rights); Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 790
P.2d 404, 404 (Kan. 1990) (involving former partner suing firm for wrongful dis-
charge and fraud);Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 144 (N.J.
1992) (concerning former partner's lawsuit for compensation due under service
termination agreement). Law firms have also resorted to litigation in an attempt
to enforce partnership agreements or otherwise protect the firm's interests. E.g.,
Williams & Montgomery, Ltd. v. Stellato, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (111. App. Ct.
1990) (attempting to enjoin former partners from soliciting clients of the firm);
Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (seeking accounting of
withdrawing attorney's fees collected after departure); see alsoJohnson, supra note
4, at 7 (discussing bitter disputes over clients by existing partner and former firm);
Lavine, supra note 15, at 1, col. 4 (describing ex-partner's struggle with former firm
over clients). Many of the most bitter litigation fights today involve clients, funds
and even office space claimed by both the firm and the departing attorney. Tamar
Lewin, When Law Partners Split Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1984, at D12, col. 3.
19. Rita HenleyJensen, Scenes from a Breakup, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 8, 1988, at 46
(discussing Finley, Kimble break-up). See generally Terry, supra note 16, at 1058-61
(discussing "soap opera" type breakup stories).
20. Mary Ann Galante, Lawsuit Flury Follows Dissolution of Belli Firm; Whose
Cases Were They?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 4, col. 3 (describing physical alterca-
tion between partner and Belli). See generally Terry, supra note 16, at 1058-61 (cit-
ing variety of law firm break-up cases).
21. Martin Fox, 4 Lawyers Who Left L.I. Firm Barred From Seeking Its Clients,
N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1986, at 1, col. 3. The attorneys were involved in the "systematic
solicitation" of their ex-firm's clients. Id.
22. See Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 488 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (fI1. App. Ct. 1986)
(concerning lawyer who induced client to sign contingent fee contract by falsely
representing that he was still associated with former law firm).
23. Norman Oder, Firm Enmeshed in Litigation Over Split, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 30,
1987, at 32, col. 3 (discussing restructuring of nationally known firm of Preiser &
Wilson).
24. EllenJ. Pollack, Partner Charges Firm Conspired To Oust Him, Am. LAw., Sept.
1980, at 14. Internal disputes between lawyers can lead to verbal disputes in front
of clients, the breakdown of professional and friendly relationships, and "absolute
war" before they are settled. Id.
25. Ellen J. Pollack, Withdrawal Today: Big News Becomes Old News, LEGAL
ECON., May/June 1987, at 58.
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clients that his colleague was "not competent," "senile" and "a
crook and a cheat."26 Although these departure-based conflicts
take their toll on the participating lawyers,27 the innocent client re-
mains the ultimate loser.28 Unfortunately, in an era where such
events are commonplace, law firms will increasingly try to enforce
postemployment restrictive covenants.
III. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
A covenant not to compete in a partnership agreement usually
requires a departing partner to refrain from associating with a com-
petitor or establishing a competing business for a specific period of
time in a particular geographical area.29 Problems concerning cov-
26. Galante, supra note 20, at 10, col. 3.
27. See Mary Ann Galante, For Firms, Breaking Up is Hard To Do, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
26, 1985, at 44 (analogizing departure to divorce proceeding); Pollack, supra note
25, at 59. Pollack observed:
The comparison of partnership withdrawals, voluntary or involuntary, to
divorce may be a cliche, but it is still an apt description of what lawyers
endure when a colleague leaves a firm. Friends for decades no longer
speak; nobody can agree on money. When the resulting feuds get out of
control, fortunes are spent on litigation and thousands of precious hours
frittered away.
Pollack, supra note 25, at 59. See generally Meeting of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee of the Section of Business Law, Held at the Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges, Oct. 3, 1988, reprinted in ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAw FIRM BREAxups 241 app.
E (1990) (discussing complexities inherent in dissolution or reorganization of law
firm).
28. Law firm break-ups usually spawn petty disputes that end up hurting the
client. SeeVollgraffv. Block, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (N.Y. 1982) (involving clients'
lawsuit for malpractice because case was allegedly neglected during break-up); see
also Terry, supra note 16, at 1060 (noting judicial recognition that "the main loser
is the innocent client"). Because a break-up is likely to command a great deal of
the lawyer's attention, the client's affairs can easily be overlooked. Id. at 1061.
Malpractice actions have often followed law firm break-ups. Id. at 1060.
29. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625
(1960). In many contexts, covenants not to compete serve to protect legitimate
interests of vendors, lessors and employers. Nevertheless, they have traditionally
been treated as "restraints of trade," and, as such, have been subject to much judi-
cial scrutiny. See id. at 626 n.3 (noting that covenants not to compete have
presented problems for courts for over 500 years); Timothy D. Scrantom & Cherie
L. Wilson, Postemployment Covenants Not To Compete in South Carolina: Wizards and
Dragons in the Kingdom, 42 S.C. L. REv. 657, 660-63 (1991) (tracing historical devel-
opment of case law regarding employee covenants not to compete). For an exami-
nation of the current law regarding covenants not to compete between physicians,
see Getty, supra note 6, at 235. To be held unenforceable as an impermissible
restriction on a lawyer's right to practice, an agreement need not be drafted or
intended as a covenant not to compete. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch,
Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990) (finding clause
that provided for forfeiture of departure benefits upon departing attorney's com-
mitting acts detrimental to partnership was, in effect, covenant not to compete);
Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 999 (N.Y. 1993)
(holding agreement unenforceable, notwithstanding benign intent of partners).
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enants not to compete have been before the courts for more than
500 years.30 Nevertheless, the emergence of similar covenants in
postemployment agreements between attorneys is a relatively recent
phenomena whose genesis can be traced to the early twentieth
century.
31
A. The Canons and the Pre-1960s "Balancing Test'5
2
The Alabama State Bar Association promulgated the first code
30. See Blake, supra note 29, at 626 (stating that "restraints of trade" agree-
ments have been before courts for more than 500 years); see also Broad v.Jollyfe, 79'
Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1620) (dealing with late medieval apprentice system and trans-
fers of property associated therewith). The classic common law trade restraints
were divided into two distinct categories:
1) restraints "ancillary" to valid underlying contracts, including, in addi-
tion to employment agreements ... assignment of patent rights, leases of
property for business purpose, and more recently employee-retirement
agreements;
2) restraints not "ancillary" to valid underlying contracts, but typically un-
dertaken to divide territory or markets, limit production, pool profits, fix
prices, or buy out potential competitors. "Nonancillary" arrangements
did not come to be commonly regarded as subject to the traditional "re-
straint of trade" doctrines either in the United States or England until the
nineteenth century.
Blake, supra note 29, at 626 n.3. In 1798, the first direct restraint case was decided.
Id. (citing Smith v. Scot, 4 Paton 17 (H.L. 1798) (Scot.)). The first American case
dealing with a restraint of trade is Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223 (1811). See generally
Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. Cm. L. REv.
703, 707-12 (1985) (tracing development of common law governing postemploy-
ment restrictive covenants).
31. See Heinz v. Roberts, 110 N.W. 1034, 1036 (Iowa 1907) (enforcing non-
competition clause in conjunction with sale of law practice). In Heinz, the cove-
nant stated:
It is further agreed on the part of saidJ.S. Roberts that he will not open a
law office in the town of Ackley, Iowa, or in the vicinity thereof, or prac-
tice in his profession in said town or vicinity for the period of ten years
from and after this date; except to close the business now in his hands;
and should the said John S. Roberts in any manner violate the terms of
this agreement, he shall forfeit and pay to the said John R. Heinz the sum
of $600, the same being the agreed and stipulated damages for said
breach. And the said J.S. Roberts further agrees to give his time and at-
tention to the business now as established, and to secure new additional
and other business for said office from this date to the 10th day ofJune,
1904.
Id. at 1035; see also Thorn v. Kinsmoor, 178 P. 445, 445 (Kan. 1919) (upholding
noncompetition clause). See generally Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not To Compete
and the Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 423 (1985) (discussing history of cove-
nants not to compete in attorney contracts).
32. Professor Stephen E. Kalish asserts that prior to the promulgation of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the enforceability of noncompetition
clauses in attorney contracts was governed by a "balancing test" approach. Kalish,
supra note 31, at 427-28.
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of professional ethics in 1887.33 The Alabama Code of Professional
Ethics required a lawyer to guard against the "rough tongue,"34 ex-
tol the morality of a minister,3 5 and avoid the display of a special
concern for the jurors' uncomfortable situation.36 The Alabama
Code, however, had no explicit provision dealing with postemploy-
ment restrictive covenants between lawyers.37 Moreover, the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics, the first attempt by the American
Bar Association (ABA) to codify a uniform body of ethical rules,
lacked such a provision.
38
Prior to the 1960s, courts rarely distinguished between restric-
tive covenants among attorneys and restrictive covenants in other
professions.39 Following the First Restatement of Contracts, pub-
lished in 1932, courts frequently enforced covenants that were not
overbroad or did not create undue hardship.4° Reasonable cove-
33. Alabama State Bar Ass'n Code of Ethics (1887), reprinted in HENRY S.
DRINKER, LEcA ETHics 352 (1953).
34. Id. "It is not a desirable professional reputation to live and die with-that of
a rough tongue, which makes a man to be sought out and retained to gratify the
malevolent feeling of a suitor, in hearing the other side well lashed and vilified."
Id. at 358.
35. Id. at 352. The Alabama Code of Ethics stated: "There is, perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more
imperatively necessary than that of the law." Id.
36. Id. at 362-63. The Alabama Code stated:
It is the duty of the court and its officers to provide for the comfort of
jurors. Displaying special concern for their comfort, and volunteering to
ask favors for them, while they are present-such as frequent motions to
adjourn trials, or take recess, solely on the ground of the jury's fatigue, or
hunger, and uncomfortableness of their seats, or the court-room, and the
like-should be avoided.
Id.
37. See Alabama State Bar Ass'n Code of Ethics (1887) (lacking provision gov-
erning restrictive covenants between attorneys), reprinted in DRINKER, supra note 34.
38. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHmics (1908) (lacking provision governing
noncompetition agreements between attorneys).
39. See e.g., Hicklin v. O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (l. App. Ct. 1956) (enforc-
ing reasonable covenant not to compete); Heinz v. Roberts, 110 N.W. 1034, 1036
(Iowa 1907) (enforcing reasonable covenant not to compete); Smalley v. Greene, 3
N.W. 78, 80 (Iowa 1879) (holding reasonable covenant not to compete valid);
Thorn v. Dinsmoor, 178 P. 445, 445 (Kan. 1919) (enforcing noncompetition
clause between attorneys). See generally Blake, supra note 29, at 659-62 (discussing
restrictive covenants). "Restraints upon professional employees, such as associates
or professional assistants of lawyers, doctors, architects, accountants, and dentists,
are also generally upheld when the customer relationships are substantial." Blake,
supra note 29 at 662. But see Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499-500 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1975) (distinguishing restrictive covenants between lawyers from "general
category of agreements restricting post-employment competition").
40. RESTATEMENT (FIs'r) OF CoNTrAcrs § 515 (Proposed Final Draft No. 11,
1932); see e.g., Hicklin, 138 N.E.2d at 48 (acknowledging that reasonable restrictive
covenant valid); Toulmin v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778, 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954)
(upholding restrictive employment agreement based upon standard of reasonable-
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nants were upheld as valid.41 The courts defined reasonableness by
balancing the competing interests. 42
Unsatisfied with this balancing approach, the ABA stated in a
1945 ethics opinion that an attempt to "barter in clients [is] incon-
sistent with the best concepts of our professional status" and vio-
lates the Canons of Ethics. 43 Despite this adoption of the barter
rationale, common law courts enforced the noncompetition clauses
without discussing the possible ethical considerations.
44
ness); see also Blake, supra note 29, at 662 n.112 (noting general enforceability of
covenants involving solicitors). Section 515 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts
articulates the factors to be used in determining whether a covenant is reasonable.
The Restatement employs the following illustration:
A, a lawyer, employs B, a young lawyer, as his clerk, who as part of the
bargain covenants not to engage in the practice of law within the State
after the termination of the employment. Although A's practice extends
throughout the State, the covenant is illegal since it imposes undue hard-
ship upon B.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcrs § 515 Illus. 5; see also Kalish, supra note 31, at
428 (utilizing Restatement illustration). But cf Milton Handler & Daniel E.
Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv.
669, 719 n.247 (1982) (arguing that illustration does not demonstrate that cove-
nant constituting restriction was reasonable).
41. See Toulmin, 124 N.E.2d at 783 (balancing interests to determine whether
covenant was reasonable). For a list of sources stating the proposition that reason-
able covenants are to be upheld, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Toulmin, 124 N.E.2d at 784. The court in Toulmin stated:
In giving consideration to these facts it would appear that the restrictions
applicable to the states of Ohio and Michigan for a period of five years is
reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's business and is
not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the defendant. He still
has the remaining states and territories of the United States as well as the
remainder of the world for the practice of his profession. This would
constitute only a limited restraint of trade and would not be in contraven-
tion of public policy.
Id. The court concluded that the restrictions were not unreasonable as to time
and space. Id.; see also Kalish, supra note 32, at 427-29 (noting that prior to 1960s,
courts balanced competing interests to determine if noncompetition clauses were
reasonable, valid and enforceable). But cf. Duyer, 336 A.2d at 501 (criticizing Hick-
lin). According to the Dwtyer court, Hicklin "incorrectly proceeded upon the theory
that the restrictive covenant imposed no undue burden upon the attorney and
completely ignored the effect the covenant might have upon potential clients." Id.
43. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 266
(1945). The wording was taken from the New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Op. 109 (Oct. 6, 1943). See Duyer, 336 A.2d at 499-500
(recognizing negative public policy implications for treating lawyers' clients like
chattels). See generally Kalish, supra note 31, at 427 (discussing opinion of Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics).
44. See Hicklin v. O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (finding it
unnecessary to determine whether non-competition clause violated Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics); see also Kalish, supra note 31, at 427 (discussing early cases re-
jecting barter rationale).
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B. Pre-Code Ethic's Opinions: The Evolution of a Jurisprudential
Change in Legal Ethics
The 1908 Canons of Professional Responsibility made no ex-
press reference to restrictive covenants between attorneys and the
issue was not addressed in a formal ethics opinion until 1961. 45 In
its Formal Opinion 300, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
considered whether an attorney and an employer may enter into an
agreement that contains a restrictive covenant preventing the em-
ployee from practicing law for a specified period of time after the
employment terminates.46 Relying heavily on the language of Ca-
non 7, which stated that "[e]fforts, direct or indirect, in any way to
encroach upon the business of another lawyer, are unworthy of
those who should be brethren at the Bar," the Committee con-
cluded that the agreement constituted a per se violation of profes-
sional ethics.
47
Surprisingly, most of the Committee's reasoning focused on
the participating lawyers rather than on the public or the clients
involved.48 According to the Committee, such agreements were not
consistent with the professional status of lawyers and fostered an
impermissible bartering in clients. Such restrictive agreements fur-
ther created an "unwarranted restriction on the right of a lawyer to
choose where he will practice."49 Thus, the Committee extolled the
rights of lawyers while failing to consider the lawyers' obligations to
their clients and to the public. In addition, the Committee recog-
nized the interests of an employer-law firm in the continued pa-
45. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (present-
ing restrictive covenants as question of first impression); see also Blake, supra note
29, at 662 n.112 (discussing restrictive covenants among professional employees).
In his review of restrictive covenants, Professor Blake noted that "[a] merican law-
yers apparently do not use such covenants extensively, or at least do not take them
to court." Blake, supra note 29, at 662 n.112.
46. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300. The restrictive cove-
nant at issue would have prevented the employee from practicing in the same city
and county as the employer attorney for two years after termination of the agree-
ment. Id.
47. Id. In the opinion, the Committee also referred to Canons 35, 27, 6 and
37. Id. Canon 35 described the attorney-client relationship as personal and indi-
vidual, such that the practice of law was not a business to be bought and sold. Id.
Likewise, Canon. 27 prohibited attorneys from soliciting clients, while Canons 6
and 37 required attorneys to uphold client confidences and not to reveal secrets.
Id.
48. Kalish, supra note 31, at 429-30 (analyzing Committee's reasoning in For-
mal Opinion 300). Compare ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300
(focusing on protecting lawyers' professional autonomy) with Dwyer v. Jung, 336
A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (focusing on clients' right to choose counsel),
aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975).
49. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300.
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tronage of its clients, as well as its desire to protect client
confidences. 50 As such, the Committee considered lawyers to be
ethically prohibited from soliciting clients of a former employer,
and from disclosing the confidences of former clients.51 Because
the Committee believed these professional and ethical considera-
tions to be sufficient to control lawyers' postemployment behavior,
restrictive covenants in employment contracts were deemed unnec-
essary and improper.52
Seven years later, in an Informal Opinion, the Committee ex-
tended this reasoning to partnership agreements between law-
yers.53 The Committee discussed the rationale of Formal Opinion
300 but also asserted additional reasons for adopting a per se rule.54
Unlike Formal Opinion 300, which only guarded the interests of
attorneys, Informal Opinion 1072 focused on the interests of clients
and the public.5 5 The Committee stated that restrictive covenants
"by their very expression tend to derogate from the trust and confi-
dence necessarily inherent in [attorney-client] relations."56 More-
over, the Committee believed that the covenants infringed upon a
client's freedom to choose a lawyer and "treat[ed] the practice of
law as a commercial business rather than as a profession."57 Finally,
the Committee reasoned that a private agreement, such as an em-
ployment covenant, could not usurp the state's sole authority to
certify an individual to practice law.58
50. Id. In recognizing a law firm's interests, the Committee relied on the ethi-
cal restraints against revealing clients' confidences found in Canons 6 and 37. Id.
51. Id. The Committee considered Canon 27's prohibition of the solicitation
of clients to reach this conclusion. Id.
52. Id.
53. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968). Specifi-
cally, the Committee considered whether a restrictive covenant, contained in a
partnership agreement among five attorneys, was proper. Id.
54. Id. The Committee was concerned with the lawyer's right to practice law,
the prohibition against bartering in clients and the client's desire to retain a partic-
ular attorney. Id.; see also Kalish, supra note 32, at 430-31 (discussing rationale of
Informal Opinion 1072).
55. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968). The Com-
mittee highlighted the client's right to choose his or her own attorney. Id.; see also
Kalish, supra note 31, at 430-31 (discussing rationale of Informal Opinion 1072).
56. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (quoting Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 688
(1945)).
57. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072.
58. Id.; see also Kalish, supra note 31, at 430-31 (discussing rationale of Infor-
mal Opinion 1072).
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C. Adopting the Model Code
By 1969, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics' stance on
postemployment restrictive covenants was entrenched in the juris-
prudence of professional ethics.59 The Committee believed that
the mandates of the Canons of Professional Ethics adequately pro-
tected the legitimate interests of law firms, attorneys, clients and the
public.60 Subsequently, however, the ABA adopted the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.61 The Model Code included a sec-
tion that expressly addressed postemployment covenants restricting
a lawyer's right to practice. Disciplinary Rule 2-108 (hereinafter DR
2-108) stated:
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a
partnership or employment agreement with another
lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice
law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of
retirement benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy
or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
that restricts his right to practice law.
62
The ABA cited Formal Opinion 300 in a footnote to DR 2-
59. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 2-108(A) (1969)
(discussing agreements restricting practice of lawyer); Kalish, supra note 31, at 431
(discussing Committee's firm stand on noncompetition clauses). See generally
Draper, supra note 4, at 163-65 (discussing impact of DR 2-108(A)).
60. Kalish, supra note 31, at 431. For a discussion of Ethics Committee opin-
ions, see supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. An antisolicitation provision
appeared in the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon of Professional Ethics
No. 28 prohibits a lawyer from "stirring up strife and litigation," which constitutes
a ban on solicitation. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). The ban evolved
from the common law actions of maintenance, champerty, and barratry, which
prevented a lawyer from creating litigation. See id. Barratry is the "offense of fre-
quently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise."
BLACus LAW DICTIONARY 150 (6th ed. 1990) (citing State v. Batson, 17 S.E.2d 511,
512-13 (N.C. 1941)). Champerty, in old English law, was a share or division of
land. Blacks Law Dictionary defines champerty as a "bargain between a stranger
and a party... by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of
receiving part of any judgment proceeds." Id. at 231. Maintenance is "[a]n offi-
cious intermeddling in a lawsuit by a non-party by maintaining, supporting or as-
sisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the
litigation." Id. at 954; see also Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 525 S.W.2d 819,
823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (stating maintenance was developed to prevent officious
intermeddling and the stirring up of strife and contention by vexatious and specu-
lative litigation).
61. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (A) (1969).
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108.63 It is therefore likely that the ABA intended to adopt the per
se approach in its promulgation of the disciplinary rule.64 One no-
table exception applies, however. The per se rule is inapplicable if
the restrictive covenant is contingent on the payment of retirement
benefits.65 This retirement provision is entirely consistent with the
rationale behind DR 2-108(A) and Formal Opinion 300, because
retirement, by definition, requires the attorney to cease practic-
ing.66 Recognizing the policy arguments promulgated in ABA
Formal Opinion 300 and Informal Opinion 1072, jurisdictions
adopting ethical codes based on the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility have found postemployment restrictive covenants to
be unenforceable.
67
63. See id. at n.93. Footnote 93 reads, in part:
[A] general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving the
employment, from practicing in the community for a stated period, ap-
pears to this Committee to be an unwarranted restriction on the right of
a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent with our pro-
fessional status. Accordingly, the Committee is of the opinion it would be
improper for the employing lawyer to require the covenant and likewise
for the employed lawyer to agree to it.
Id.; see also Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411-12 (N.Y. 1989) (dis-
cussing ABA Formal Opinion 300 and DR 2-108(A)). In Cohen, the New York
Court of Appeals stated that "[w] hen the Code of Professional Responsibility was
adopted, DR 2-108(A) codified the ruling, and the rationale of Opinion No. 300
has been applied to bar restrictive covenants among law firm partners." Cohen, 550
N.E.2d at 411.
64. Kalish, supra note 31, at 432.
65. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (A).
66. See Kalish, supra note 31, at 432 (discussing retirement exception to DR 2-
108(A)); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 327 (1971) (discussing retirement benefits). Formal Opinion 327 states that
"it would appear to be equally permissible to make payments to a retired partner
or for a fixed period to the estate of a deceased partner in accordance with a pre-
existing retirement plan, the amount of those payments being measured by subse-
quent earnings of the firm." Id. But cf. Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eber-
hardt, 790 P.2d 404, 411-13 (Kan. 1990) (upholding provision in partnership
agreement that provided benefits for expelled partners who qualify for retirement
only if expelled partner quits practicing law). See generally Roger B. Howard, Draft-
ing Restrictive Covenants Between Lawyers, 64 FLA. B.J. June 1991, at 12 (explaining
how to draft "enforceable" withdrawal and retirement covenants).
67. Whether expressly based on state rules derived from DR 2-108(A) or on
other rules governing relationships between attorneys, or relationships between
attorneys and their clients, states have invalidated covenants that restrict or pro-
hibit a lawyer's right to practice law. See e.g., District of Columbia Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 181 (1987) (finding agreement oppressive and unenforceable as vio-
lating DR 2-108(A) because attorney "covenant[ed] not to disrupt, impair or inter-
fere with the business of the Firm in any way, whether by way of interfering with or
raiding its employees, or disrupting or interfering with the Firm's relationship with
its clients, agents, representatives ... or otherwise"); District of Columbia Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 122 (1983) (finding partnership agreement forbidding depart-
ing partner from serving firm clients for 18 months unethical under DR 2-108 (A));
Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 108
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D. Time for a Change: Adoption of the Model Rules
In 1977, the ABA created the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards to evaluate the existing standards of profes-
sional conduct.68 Instead of amending the Model Code, the
Commission drafted the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,
intended to replace the Model Code.6 9 The Model Rules were
adopted in 1983 and currently embody the ABA's official
position.
70
Similar to the pre-existing Model Code, the present Model Rules
contain a prohibition against restrictions on the right to practice
(1981) (relying on DR 2-108(A) to hold geographical restrictions on lawyer's prac-
tice invalid); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 84-
15 (1985) (finding employment agreement to be improper because it required
departing lawyers to compensate former employer with 25% of all new fees col-
lected from clients who previously did business with that corporation); State Bar of
Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. C-1145 (1986) (holding as
unethical liquidated damage provisions that penalize departing partners who serve
former firm's clients); NewJersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 147
(1969) (relying on proposed draft of Model Code as basis for determining that
agreement prohibiting withdrawing partner from competing within county for five
years was unethical); New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Op. 621 (1974) (conclud-
ing that DR 2-108(A) prohibits lawyers from entering restrictive covenants con-
cerning practice of law); Texas State Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 459
(1988) (explaining that DRs 2-107 (A) and 2-108 (A) prohibit lawyers from entering
into restrictive covenants); Texas State Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 422
(i984) (finding agreements attempting to prohibit departing attorneys from solic-
iting former firm's clients unnecessary because of ethical prohibitions against solic-
itation); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 428 (1981)
(holding that firm may not restrict departing partner's right to practice law by
withholding termination compensation from departing partners who compete
with firm).
68. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (Chairman's Intro-
duction) (describing evolution of Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
69. See id. (discussing creation of Model Rules); see also Leonard Gross, Ethical
Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 279-80 (1985) (discuss-
ing adoption of Model Rules). For a discussion of model ethical codes in the con-
text of covenants not to compete between attorneys, see Draper, supra note 4, at
162-66. Draper pointed out that "[e] thical codes.., are not law. Both the [Model
Code of Professional Responsibility] and the [Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct] disclaim any attempt to govern civil actions." Draper, supra note 4, at 164.
For example, the Model Rules state:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed
to be a basis for civil liability.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (1983). Notwithstanding the
careful language of the Model Rules, many jurisdictions have been influenced by
the public policies embodied in the rules and, in effect, have given the rules the
full force of law. For a collection of these jurisdictions, see supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
70. Gross, supra note 69, at 279-80.
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law.71 Model Rule 5.6 provides:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts
the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits
upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between private parties. 72
Using language substantially similar to DR 2-108, the rule
seems to restate the conventional wisdom of the past.73 As the legal
landscape has changed, however, so too has the rationale behind
the rule. Once attacked as being "unseemly," "unprofessional" or
even "ungentlemanly," the Model Rules condemn restrictive cove-
nants as unethical attempts to limit the client's right to freely
choose counsel.
74
While expressing the policy concerns voiced in ABA Formal
Opinion 300 and Informal Opinion 1072, the comment to Model
Rule 5.6 indicates that the rule is intended to rearticulate the lan-
guage and spirit of DR 2-108. 75 The comment states that "[a]n
agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice
71. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1969)
with MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.6 (1983).
72. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6.
73. See GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & W. WILIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 822 (2d ed.
Supp. 1992) (discussing Rule 5.6).
74. Id.; see also Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500-01 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.)
(invalidating restrictive covenant that burdened client's choice of counsel), affd,
348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d
563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing public protection policy in prohibition
against lawyers' restrictive covenants); cf Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power,
Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 600-01 (Iowa 1990) (refusing to enforce fi-
nancial detriment clause that operated as covenant not to compete); Denburg v.
Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998-99 (N.Y. 1993) (reaffirming
osition against restrictions on lawyers' right to practice law because "they inter-
fere with the client's choice of counsel").
In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Iowa noted that:
[A]n economic disincentive for the lawyer may operate to the detriment
of the client. Faced with a choice of taking a share of the firm's profits or
some of its clients, a partner may well choose the former if it yields a net
economic benefit. In that case, the clients' freedom of choice has been
bargained away just as effectively as if the partnership agreement con-
tained a bald restrictive covenant.
Anderson, 461 N.W.2d at 602 (quoting ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAw FIRM BREAKuPs 32
(1990)).
75. See Kalish, supra note 31, at 433 (discussing comments to Model Rule 5.6).
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after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but
also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer."76 States fol-
lowing the Model Rules have therefore reached the same conclu-
sion as jurisdictions adopting the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility; postemployment restrictive covenants are per se
unenforceable.
77
IV. ARE LAWYERS DIFFERENT?
Upon admission to the bar, the neophyte lawyer is no longer
cloaked in the garb of the commonplace man.78 Instead, he or she
has entered into a new life, accompanied by greater responsibilities
and additional duties. 79 Admission to the bar places the attorney
"in a new relation to his fellow [man or woman]."80 The rules of
the game have changed; the attorney has become an officer of the
courts and a representative of the public. It becomes his or her
duty to aid in carrying out justice between individuals of the public,
should any of them seek assistance. 8'
The prohibition against postemployment restrictive covenants
embodied in the Model Rules distinguishes lawyering from other
businesses and professions.8 2 For example, businesspersons, ac-
76. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 cmt. (1983).
77. Texas has adopted a modified version of the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Texas equivalent to Model Rule 5.6, Texas State Bar Rule 5.06,
contains an exception that permits a restrictive covenant that is part of a settle-
ment of a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer. Texas Rule 5.06 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agree-
ment concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice
is part of the settlement of a suit or controversy, except that as part of the
settlement of a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer an agreement
may be made placing restrictions on the right of that lawyer to practice.
TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.06 (Supp. 1995); see
Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437, 443-44 (Tex. Ct. App.) ("A clear
reading.., reveals that the supreme court intended the prohibition on settlement
agreements to apply to settlements on a client's behalf, not settlements of discipli-
nary proceedings."), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991); see also Texas State Bar Pro-
fessional Ethics Comm., Op. 459 (1988) (stating that postemployment restrictive
covenant violates rules based on Model Code); cf Texas State Bar Professional
Ethics Comm., Op. 466 (1990) (upholding retirement exception to rule based on
Model Code).
78. See LEONARD G. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF A LAWYER 35 (1910)
(discussing how lawyers differ socially).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id.
82. See HILLMAN, supra note 17, at 29 (discussing unique nature of prohibition
on lawyer's restrictive covenants).
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countants and physicians frequently sign noncompetition agree-
ments.83 Some commentators assert that the policy arguments for
setting lawyers apart from other professions are tenuous, and ques-
tion whether the clients' freedom to choose their desired profes-
sional is any less crucial when the professional is a physician, rather
than a lawyer.84
Nevertheless, contemporary courts have closed their ears to
such arguments. For example, in Dwyer v. Jung,85 a New Jersey Su-
perior Court recognized that lawyers' restrictive covenants should
be distinguished from those of other professions.86 The court in
Dwyer emphasized a client's unimpeded right to choose an attorney,
and contended that "[c]ommercial standards may not be used to
evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants."87 The
83. See, e.g., Fuller v. Brough, 411 P.2d 18, 21 (Colo. 1966) (upholding reason-
able restrictive covenant between accountants); Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical As-
socs., 320 S.E.2d 170, 172-74 (Ga. 1984) (enforcing covenant not to compete
found in partnership agreement among physicians); Rhoads v. Clifton, Gunderson
& Co., 411 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that reasonable non-
competition clause in accountant's employment contract was valid); Gelder Medi-
cal Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977) (enforcing restrictive
covenant against physician expelled from group medical practice).
Many commentators have discussed judicial treatment of covenants not to
compete and related restrictions between accountants and doctors. See, e.g., HIL.
MAN, supra note 17, at 29 (noting that accountants and physicians frequently agree
to restrictive covenants); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not To Compete
Between Physicians: Protecting Doctors'Interests at Patients'Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REv.
1, 1-48 (1992) (discussing covenants not to compete among physicians); Getty,
supra note 6, at 244-53 (discussing various interests implicated by covenants not to
compete among doctors); Stuart L. Pachman, Accountants and Restrictive Covenants:
The Client Commodity, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 312, 316-19 (1983) (comparing en-
forcement of accountants' noncompetition clauses); Jill M. Mayo, Comment, The
Antitrust Ramifications of NonCompetition Clauses in the Partnership and Employment
Agreements of Doctors, 30 Loy. L. REv. 307, 322-32 (1984) (presenting interests con-
sidered when courts examine noncompetition clauses between doctors); Ferdi-
nand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on
Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Partnership Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3n
970, 974-1005 (1975) (providing discussion of legitimacy of anticompetitive agree-
ments between doctors).
For a general discussion of postemployment restrictive covenants within a
broader context, which provides an extensive discussion on the historical develop-
ment and enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment agreements, see
Blake, supra note 29, at 629-51. For a discussion of South Carolina case law on post
employment covenants not to compete, which calls on courts to reexamine compe-
tition law so as to make it more reasonable and reliable for practicing attorneys,
see Scrantom & Wilson, supra note 29, at 663-82.
84. HILLMAN, supra note 17, at 29; Kafker, supra note 4, at 52-57.
85. 336 A.2d 498 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div.
1975).
86. Id. at 499. The restrictive covenant at issue in Dwyer sought to allocate a
partnership's clients between the various partner attorneys when the partnership
terminated. Id.
87. Id. at 500. According to the court, the application of commercial stan-
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Dwyer court was persuaded by the policy arguments supporting the
adoption of DR 2-108(A) of the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.88 Consequently, the Dwyer court held the restrictive
covenant to be "void as against public policy."
8 9
In Karlin v. Weinberg,90 the trial court attempted to apply the
Dwyer standard to physicians, holding a restrictive covenant between
medical doctors was unenforceable. 91 The trial court concluded
that "the covenant would prevent defendant's services from being
'reasonably accessible' by virtue of the distance a former patient
would have to travel, and, therefore, the 'public right' was vio-
lated."92 On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court disagreed, stat-
ing that Dwyer was grounded in the language of DR 2-108(A) and
the medical profession did not have an analogous ethical provi-
sion.93 Consequently, the court held that the lawyer exception to
the "reasonableness" standard did not apply to the medical
profession.
9 4
The New Jersey Superior Court has also refused to extend the
Dwyer rationale to accountants.9 5 Relying on the reasonableness
dards to lawyers' restrictive covenants is precluded by strong policy considerations.
Id. Because the attorney-client relationship is consensual and "highly fiduciary on
the part of counsel," an attorney may do nothing that restricts the clients right to
freely choose counsel. Id. "No concept of the law is more deeply rooted." Id.; see
also Kalish, supra note 31, at 434-38 (discussing Duyer decision).
88. Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500-01. For a discussion of DR 2-108, see supra notes
62-67 and accompanying text.
89. Duyer, 336 A.2d at 501. The court's reasoning was founded upon the prin-
ciples underlying DR 2-108(A). See id. at 501. Specifically the court stated:
We recognize in the legal profession the existence of a "client market"
which is divided among lawyers within a particular locality. But the divi-
sion of that "market" can be ethically achieved only through individual
performance and the "establishment of a well-merited reputation for pro-
fessional capacity and fidelity to trust."
Id. (quoting NewJersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 147 (1969)).
90. 372 A.2d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 390 A.2d 1161
(1978).
91. Id. at 618.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 618. But cf Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
(Buttler, P.J., dissenting). In Ladd, Judge Buttler noted that the public need for
doctors exceeds the need for lawyers. Judge Buttler wrote, "I think it is safe to say
that the public need and demand for doctors is, generally, greater than the need
and demand for lawyers; afortiori, such covenants between doctors should be held
to contravene public policy and not be enforced." Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Karlin, 372 A.2d at 618 (stating that "there is no comparable provision of
law which makes it illegal for a doctor voluntarily to agree to restrict his practice of
medicine from a given area").
95. See Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d 75, 78-80 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (applying reasonableness test to non-compete clause in
accountant's contract).
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test, the court in Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson96 was un-
certain as to whether the potential injurious effect on the public,
which justified the reasonableness standard, warranted the adop-
tion of a per se approach. 97 Although the Edelson court came close
to extending the Duyer rationale to accountants, such a per se rule
was rejected.98
V. THE CORNERSTONE: COHEN V. Low, DAY6 9 LoRw
In 1985, Richard G. Cohen, partner and head of the tax de-
partment at the law firm of Lord, Day & Lord, resigned from the
firm to become a partner in a rival New York City law firm.99 Co-
hen's partnership agreement with Lord, Day & Lord entitled with-
drawing partners to their proportionate share of the profits from
unpaid fees for services they had rendered prior to their depar-
ture. 00 Upon requesting this "departure compensation," Cohen
was informed that he had surrendered his right to such compensa-
tion by accepting employment with a rival firm.101 The firm relied
on a forfeiture-for-competition clause contained in the partnership
96. 444 A.2d 75 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
97. Id. at 80 (demonstrating propriety of reasonableness standard). The
court stated:
Accountants are not commercial business people like the salespersons re-
stricted by noncompetition agreements in [other cases]. Accountants,
like doctors and lawyers, are engaged in a profession which necessarily
requires clients to reveal personal and confidential information to them
in the course of the professional relationship. Like the lawyer-client rela-
tionship characterized in Duyer, the accountant-client relationship is also
consensual and fiduciary, and the right of the client to repose confidence
in the accountant of his or her choice should not readily be circum-
scribed. It is this distinction between restrictive covenants in a commer-
cial or business setting, where primarily economic interests are at stake,
and those binding professionals who depend largely on unconditional
confidential relationships to serve their clients satisfactorily, which under-
scores the greater degree of injury to the public that may occur in the
latter instance.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Kalish, supra note 31, at 436-37 (discussing Edelson
decision and noting court's uncertainty with decision to apply NewJersey reasona-
bleness test).
98. Edelson, 444 A.2d at 78.
99. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410 (N.Y. 1989). Cohen had
been a partner at Lord, Day & Lord for almost twenty years. Id.
100. Id. The clause was inserted in the partnership agreement to protect
against the possibility of automatic dissolution. Id.; see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT § 29 (1993) ("The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the parties caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carry-
ing on... of the business."); REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 601-603 (1994) (dis-
cussing partner's dissociation generally).
101. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411. Lord, Day & Lord also complained that Cohen
took an associate attorney and several clients with him to his new firm. Id.
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agreement to support its position that Cohen had relinquished his
right to the fees. 102 In response, Cohen brought suit against the law
firm to recover the amount due under the partnership agree-
ment.1
08
The New York Supreme Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Cohen.' 0 4 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court Appel-
late Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment.10 5 The New York Court of Appeals, however, ruled in
Cohen's favor, deeming the agreement unenforceable as against
public policy. 10 6 The court held that the partnership agreement
unlawfully restrained the practice of law by conditioning payment
of earned fees upon noncompetition by the withdrawing partner.10 7
102. Id. The clause provided:
Notwithstanding anything in this Article ... to the contrary, if a Partner
withdraws from the Partnership and without the prior written consent of
the Executive Committee continues to practice law in any state or other
jurisdiction in which the Partnership maintains an office or any other
contiguous jurisdiction, either as a lawyer in private practice or as a coun-
sel employed by a business firm, he shall have no further interest in and
there shall be paid to him no proportion of the net profits of the Partner-
ship collected thereafter, where for services rendered before or after his
withdrawal. There shall be paid to him only his withdrawable credit bal-
ance on the books of the Partnership at the date of his withdrawal, to-
gether with the amount of his capital account, and the Partnership shall
have no further obligation to him.
Id. at 410-11. A forfeiture-for-competition clause is an indirect restriction on the
right to practice. Direct restrictions are those that attempt to prohibit, rather than
just penalize, postemployment competition. See Draper, supra note 4, at 162-71
(discussing agreements that attempt to "discourage competition"). For an excel-
lent general discussion of employee covenants not to compete, see Blake, supra
note 29. See generally Kafker, supra note 4, at 31 (advocating enforcement of rea-
sonable restrictions rather than absolute restrictions on accountants', physicians'
and attorneys' right to practice).
103. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 410. In its entirety, the contested article Tenth
(B) (a) (i) provided:
(i) If at the time of his withdrawal he shall have been a member of the
Partnership for ten (10) years, there shall be paid, within forty-five (45)
days following the close of each of the three twelve month periods follow-
ing his withdrawal . . . a share of the profits for each such period deter-
mined by multiplying the total net profits of the Partnership for each
such period by one-third of the average of the percentages which his
shares of the net profits as distributed to him for each of the three (3)
fiscal years prior to his withdrawal bore to the total net profits of the
Partnership in each of such three (3) prior years.
Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 534 N.Y.S.2d 161,162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 550
N.E.2d 410 (1989).
104. Cohen, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
105. Id. at 163. The Appellate Division found that the covenant merely oper-
ated as a financial disincentive rather than a restrictive covenant and, conse-
quently, upheld the partnership agreement. Id.
106. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 410.
107. Id. at 411.
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Although the agreement did not expressly prohibit a departing
partner from practicing law, the monetary penalty for practicing
with a competitor imposed a financial disincentive that constituted,
in effect, an impermissible restriction on the practice of law.108
Nevertheless, the Cohen court warned that the holding should be
construed narrowly and should not be transformed "into something
broader than it is." 109 The court emphasized that it addressed only
the particular clause at issue in the context of the particular profes-
sional relationship.110
Despite this warning, numerous courts have applied the rea-
soning in Cohen to invalidate noncompetition clauses between
attorneys."' For example, in Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau &
108. Id. In invalidating the forfeiture-for-competition provision, the court
noted:
[W]hile the provision in question does not expressly or completely pro-
hibit a withdrawing partner from engaging in the practice of law, the sig-
nificant monetary penalty it exacts, if the withdrawing partner practices
competitively with the former firm, constitutes an impermissible restric-
tion on the practice of law. The forfeiture-for-competition provision
would functionally and realistically discourage and foreclose a withdraw-
ing partner from serving clients who might wish to continue to be repre-
sented by the withdrawing lawyer and would thus interfere with the
client's choice of counsel.
Id.; see also NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILIT DR 2-108(A) (mirror-
ing Model Code DR 2-108 in prohibiting a lawyer from "participat[ing] in a[n] ...
agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law
after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a condi-
tion to payment of retirement benefits").
109. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 413. The court expressly limited its holding and
cautioned against a "categorical interpretation or application." Id.
110. Id. In invalidating the agreement, the court carefully evaluated the true
"issue and effect" of the forfeiture-for-competition clause. Id. The court deter-
mined that the clause violated public policy because, in effect, it forced the forfei-
ture of earned revenues. Id. Central to the court's holding was the fact that the
forfeiture-for-competition clause purported to deny the departing partner previ-
ously earned, yet uncollected, fees. See id. (stating that the true effect of the clause
was not to deny "future distributions").
111. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990) (citing Cohen in upholding firm's obligation to
pay departing attorney fees earned under contract); Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin,
Powers & Eberhardt, 790 P.2d 404, 410-11 (Kan. 1990) (upholding retirement
agreement);Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 149 (NJ. 1992)
(citing Cohen for proposition that financial disincentive provisions are unenforce-
able as against public policy); Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624
N.E.2d 995, 999 (N.Y. 1993) (relying on Cohen to invalidate partnership agreement
that required withdrawing partner to pay sum to firm); Judge v. Bartlett, Pontiff,
Stewart & Rhodes, P.C., 61 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (deeming
"termination pay" agreement invalid because effect violates public policy an-
nounced in Cohen); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531
(Tenn. 1991) (applying Cohen rationale to professional corporations); see also
Graubard, Mollen, Horowitz, Pomeranz & Shapiro v. Moskovitz, 565 N.Y.S.2d 672,
674-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing Cohen while refusing to enforce clause
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Klimpl,112 the New York Court of Appeals refused to enforce a for-
feiture-for-competition clause that was arguably designed to ensure
the law firm's continued existence." 3 The court reasoned that the
clause, in effect, deterred competition and thus improperly in-
fringed upon clients' free choice of counsel. 11 4 Consequently, the
agreement was held to be unenforceable for the same policy rea-
sons suggested in Cohen.
115
Likewise, in Judge v. Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes, P.C.,116
the New York Superior Court held that a termination pay agree-
ment violated public policy because the agreement restrained the
practice of law by imposing financial disincentives against competi-
tion. 11 7 Relying on Cohen and Denburg, the court reasoned that the
agreement, in effect, limited clients' choice of counsel and was
in retirement agreement that required withdrawing partner to refer clients to for-
mer firm and refrain from anything that would impair firm's relationship with
existing clients); cf Wolt v. Sherwood, 828 F. Supp. 1562, 1569 (C.D. Utah 1993)
(citing Cohen for notion that clients' right to choose counsel cannot be restricted
by settlement agreement). But see Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158 (Cal.
1993) (rejecting Cohen and its progeny and upholding forfeiture-for-competition
clause that operates as tax on taking the former firm's clients). See generally New
York Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Ethical Issues Arising When a
Lauyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictions on Practice, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 903-09
(1993) (discussing ramifications of Cohen). "Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, in its
interpretation of DR 2-108(A), properly balances the law firm's interest in survival
with the individual lawyer's interest in personal autonomy and freedom of move-
ment. The Committee also contends that the retirement exception in DR 2-
108(A) should be construed narrowly." Id. at 909.
112. 624 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 1993).
113. Id. at 999. In Denburg, an amended partnership agreement required
withdrawing partners who continued to practice in the private sector to pay either
12.5% of the firm's profits allocated to the partner over the two previous years, or
12.5% of billings to former Parker Chapin clients made by the partner's new firm
over the ensuing two years. Id. at 997. The agreement, by its terms, did not apply
to partners who took jobs in the public sector or whose previous year's profit allo-
cation did not exceed $85,000, and whose new firm did no work for Parker Chapin
clients during the ensuing two years. Id. Parker Chapin asserted that the agree-
ment was designed merely to assure that departing partners share financial respon-
sibility for a $4.5 million loan taken out by the firm. Id. at 998.
114. Id. at 999.
115. Id. at 998-1000. The court also held that an agreement to settle a dispute
concerning a forfeiture-for-competition clause was enforceable even though the
clause itself was unenforceable. Id. at 1001-02.
116. 610 N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
117. Id. at 414. The agreement at issue in Judge included a termination pay
provision for payment upon termination of employment. Id. at 413. The provi-
sion applied to all attorneys employed with the firm for at least ten years. Id. The
agreement also provided that the terminated employees could not engage in com-
petition within a thirty mile radius of any office of the firm for a period of five




VI. THE 1990s: RENEGADE DECISIONS OR STRUCTURAL CHANGE?
As the above discussion illustrates, postemployment restrictive
covenants between attorneys generally have been considered
unenforceable.' 19 Such contractual terms were thought to violate
the ethical standard against noncompetition agreements. 20 Mod-
em jurists have broadly defined restrictive covenants to include
standard covenants not to compete after termination of employ-
ment,12 1 covenants included in the sale of a law practice, 22 liqui-
dated damage clauses, 23 noncompetition clauses in partnership
118. Id. at 414. The defendants in Judge tried to distinguish Cohen by the fact
that Cohen involved a partnership in which each partner had a vested right to full
payment of a partnership share, including earned but uncollected revenues. Id. at
413. In Judge, however, the firm was a professional services corporation where
employees contracted for employment and had no rights to profits, fees or assets
of the corporation. Id. The court rejected this distinction, noting that DR 2-
108(A) specifically applies to any employment agreement which "restricts the right
of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the
agreement." Id. at 414 (quoting DR 2-108) (A)).
119. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990) (refusing to enforce provision providing for for-
feiture of partnership interest upon causing "detriment" to former firm); Meehan
v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Mass. 1989) (construing partnership
agreement so as not to violate rule against noncompetition agreements); Dwyer v.
Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (holding clause restricting law-
yers from representing certain clients void as against public policy), affd, 348 A.2d
208 (App. Div. 1975); Denburg, 624 N.E.2d at 997 (holding forfeiture for competi-
tion provision unenforceable); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413
(N.Y. 1989) (holding clause that had effect of restricting practice of law unenforce-
able as against public policy); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d
563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding noncompetition clause unenforceable);
Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that restriction
violated disciplinary rule and was therefore unenforceable); Spiegel v. Thomas,
Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1991) (holding invalid clause
that withheld compensation to withdrawing partner who continued to practice);
Cohen v. Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1390-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding agree-
ment not to represent former firm's clients unenforceable). See generaUy HILLMAN,
supra note 17, at 26-29 (presenting early rationale to prohibit restrictive covenants
between lawyers). But cf. Hicklin v. O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)
(upholding restrictive covenant ancillary to sale of law practice); Miller v. Foulston,
Sieflin, Powers & Eberhardt, 790 P.2d 404, 410-11 (Kan. 1990) (upholding cove-
nant pursuant to retirement benefits exception).
120. Johnson, supra note 4, at 111. Professor Johnson believed that any viola-
tion of Model Rule 5.6 would subject the attorney to discipline and "render the
restrictive covenant unenforceable as against public policy. Id. at 111-12.
121. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989).
122. See, e.g., Hicklin v. O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47 (ll. App. Ct. 1956).
123. See State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. C-
1145 (1986) (stating that lawyer cannot sell or purchase goodwill of law practice or
enter employment contract that requires payment of liquidated damages); see also
Professional Guidance Comm. of the Phila. Bar Ass'n, Op. 87-24 (1988) ("A lawyer
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agreements, 12 4 restrictive covenants enforced by professional corpo-
rations 125 and forfeiture penalties for withdrawing from employer-
law firms.126
A. Ethical Considerations
Judicial hostility towards such covenants has been ventilated
through ethics opinions and case law. These opinions indicate that
the unenforceability of restrictive covenants has become cemented
in the jurisprudence of legal ethics.1 27 Unenforceability, however,
is not universally recognized. For example, in December of 1991,
the California Supreme Court left intact an appellate court opinion
that enforced a restrictive covenant in a partnership agreement. 128
In Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald,'2 seven partners de-
parted the law firm of Haight, Brown & Bonesteel and established
their own firm, Dickson, Carlson & Campillo. The former law firm
sued the departing partners for violation of the partnership agree-
ment.130 At the time of departure, the partnership agreement
provided:
[E]ach Partner agrees that, if he withdraws or voluntarily
retires from the Partnership, he will not engage in any
may not agree to an employment contract with a liquidated damages clause so
high that it restricts the lawyer's right to practice law by acting as an economic
disincentive.").
124. See Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Bar Ass'n, Op. 326 (1987) (stating lawyer
shall not enter into partnership agreement where postwithdrawal payments are
determined by whether departing attorney competes against former firm).
125. See Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 985 (1987).
This opinion permitted a restrictive covenant that allowed the value of a partner's
stock to be reduced if the partner withdrew with other partners or took clients with
him. According to the Committee, "[t]he Code only prohibits agreements that
restrict the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of the relation-
ship; agreements that effect only the termination of the relationship itself are not
prohibited." Id.
126. See Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op.
89-48 (1990) (holding law firm may not prevent lawyer from soliciting clients for
two years). "A law firm may not require a departing associate to encourage clients
to complete pending cases with the firm or prevent the departing associate from
competing in the same community or soliciting clients for two years." Id.
127. For a general discussion of the unenforceability of restrictive covenants,
see supra notes 45-77 and 99-118 and accompanying text.
128. Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), review denied, No. S020824, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 5862 (Dec. 19, 1991)
(denying petition for review); see also Law Firm Sues Two Partners for Conspiring to
Defect, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at B5, col. 2 (discussing lower court ruling and
denial of review in Haight).
129. 285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S020824, 1991
Cal. LEXIS 5862 (Dec. 19, 1991).
130. Id.
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area of the practice of law regularly practiced by the law
firm and in so doing represent or become associated with
any firm that represents any client represented by this law
firm within a twelve (12) month period prior to said per-
son leaving the firm, within the Counties of Los Angeles,
Ventura, Orange, Riverside or San Bernardino nor within
any City in such Counties for a period of three (3) years
from the date of withdrawal or retiremfient, so long as con-
tinuing members of this firm engage in practice in the
same areas of law. 131
Like the forfeiture penalty in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord,i3 2 one par-
agraph of the partnership agreement stated: "A Partner... may
violate this Section .... [But] by so doing, he forfeits any and all
rights and interests, financial and otherwise, to which he would
otherwise be thereafter entitled as a departing Partner under the
terms of this Agreement."'
33
The departing attorneys argued that the agreement demanded
a substantial monetary penalty and would thus dissuade departing
partners from handling cases for clients in competition with the
firm or from practicing law in competition with the firm. Conse-
quently, the departing attorneys argued that the partnership agree-
ment constituted an unlawful restriction on the practice of law,
which violated the public policy embodiment within rule 1-500.13
4
The California Court of Appeals, however, refused to adopt
such a narrow interpretation of Rule 1-500. While de-emphasizing
the forfeiture language of the agreement, the appellate court fo-
cused its attention on section 16602 of the California Business and
Professions Code, which provides:
131. Id.
132. For the language of the agreement at issue in Cohen, see supra note 102
and accompanying text; see also Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 151 (Cal. 1993)
(discussing forfeiture penalty for competing with former firm).
133. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.3. The lower court was uncertain as to
whether it was ruling on the enforceability of the restrictive covenant. See id. at 847
(citing to lower court uncertainty as to whether it was ruling on enforceability of
agreement). The lower court stated during a hearing for a motion for judgment
on the pleadings:
I never purported to rule on the enforceability of the language which says
that a departing partner will not engage in any area of the practice of law
regularly practiced by the law firm and so on. What I'm dealing with is
the forfeiture for violating that restriction .... I suppose, in that sense,
I'm really ruling on it.
Id. at 847 n.5. The appellate court, however, made it clear that the forfeiture pro-
vision was reasonable and the agreement was "not invalid on its face." Id. at 850.
134. Id. at 848.
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Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution
of the partnership, agree that he will not carry on a similar
business within a specified county or counties, city or cit-
ies, or a part thereof, where the partnership business has
been transacted, so long as any other member of the part-
nership, or any person deriving title to the business or its
goodwill from such other member of the partnership car-
ries on a like business therein.1 3 5
Writing on behalf of a unanimous panel, Justice Fukuto stated that
the court did not believe that the personal and confidential rela-
tionship existing between lawyers and their clients "places lawyers
in a class apart from other business and professional
partnerships." 136
135. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (Deering 1976). Compare TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16602. Section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commercial Code states:
Notwithstanding Section 15.05 of this code, a covenant not to compete is
enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains
limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be re-
strained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is
reasonably necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50.
136. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48. The California Supreme Court, in How-
ard, gave a similar reading to section 16602, stating: "The Haight court's construc-
tion [of California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1-500] is
consistent with Business and Professions Code section 16602, permitting agree-
ments between partners restricting competition." Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d
150, 156 (Cal. 1993). The Howard court rejected the public policy arguments
against forfeiture for competition clauses, relying instead on "a revolution in the
practice of law that has occurred requiring economic interests of the law firm to be
protected as they are in other business enterprises." Id. But see, e.g., Anderson v.
Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990)
(citing Cohen for proposition that restrictions on lawyer's right to practice are detri-
mental to clients); Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.)
(criticizing treatment of issue as business proposition while failing to recognize
underlying ethical considerations within legal profession), affd, 348 A.2d 208
(App. Div. 1975); Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995,
998-1000 (N.Y. 1993) (recognizing law firm's legitimate economic and survival in-
terests while invalidating a forfeiture-for-competition clause that restricted client's
free choice of counsel); cf. Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d
75, 80 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (addressing restrictive covenant as applied to
accountant, stating that "[i]t is this distinction between restrictive covenants in a
commercial ... setting, where primary economic interests are at stake, and those
binding professionals who depend largely on unconditional confidential relation-
ships . . .which underscores the greater degree of injury to the public that may
occur in the latter instance"). Justice Kennard, dissenting in Howard, lambasted
the majority's analysis for narrowly focusing on the business interests of the law
firm. Howard, 863 P.2d at 161 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard stated:
Although the law is a business in the sense that an attorney in a law firm
earns a living by practicing law, it is also and foremost a profession, with
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In reaching its conclusion, the court balanced the competing
interests of the departing attorney and the employer-law firm and
concluded that the forfeiture penalty did not violate the rules of
professional conduct of the State Bar.13 7 In balancing the equities,
the court stated that the agreement allows the departing attorney to
practice law anywhere and to accept employment from any client
"who desires to retain him." 38 Additionally, the agreement pre-
served the stability of the law firm by making the withdrawing part-
ner's share of capital and accounts receivable available to replace
the lost income from clients taken by the withdrawing partner. 3 9
The court reasoned that the monetary penalty could not be inter-
preted as prohibiting the ex-partners from practicing law, or from
representing any client, because the agreement allowed the depart-
ing attorney to compete against the employer firm.140 Only an
agreement that required the attorney to completely refrain from
practicing law would be an impermissible violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 14
all the responsibilities that the word implies. The ethical rule that this
court is called upon to interpret exists to enforce the traditional and
sound view that service to clients, including protection of the clients' abil-
ity to employ the attorneys they have come to trust, is more important
than safeguarding the economic interests of established attorneys and law
firms.
Id. at 161 (Kennard,J., dissenting).
137. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48. It should be noted that unlike the Model
Rules or the Model Code, the California Code of Professional Responsibility does
not forbid restrictive covenants if the agreement is a section of a partnership agree-
ment, provided the covenant does not survive the partnership relationship. CALi-
FORNIA STATE BAR RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1-500 (1985); see Haight,
285 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (1991) (discussing Rule 1-500 and its application); see also
Howard, 863 P.2d at 156 (agreeing with Haight court's interpretation of Rule 1-
500).
138. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848. According to the court, "the rule simply
rovides that an attorney may not enter into an agreement to refrain altogether
from the practice of law." Id.
139. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court analogized the agreement to a
1956 case, Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 299 P.2d 977 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). Haight,
285 Cal. Rptr. at 848. Farthing upheld a similar liquidated damage clause in an
agreement between physicians. Farthing, 299 P.2d at 982-83.
140. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
141. Id. Many other courts addressing similar "financial disincentive" provi-
sions have rejected the argument that such provisions should be construed differ-
ently from absolute prohibitions on the right to practice. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990)
(stating partnership agreement allowing reduction of former partner's share
served solely as penalty for continuing legal practice);Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin
& Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 150 (N.J. 1992) (stating that agreement creating disincen-
tive to accept representation violates Rules of Professional Conduct); Denburg v.
Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (stating financial
disincentives are objectionable because they interfere with client's choice of coun-
sel); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App.) (stating agreement
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By refusing to interpret the applicable Rule of Professional
Conduct "in such a narrow fashion,"142 the California Court of Ap-
peals all but rendered Rule 1-500 impotent. In effect, the Califor-
nia court emphasized the business code at the expense of the
ethical code. After Haight, a law firm employer could include a for-
feiture clause that would discourage even the noblest of attorneys.
The Haight decision was the first major break from the main-
stream, in essence, a "renegade" decision. Nevertheless, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recently adopted the reasoning of the Haight
court in Howard v. Babcock.' 43 Howard involved a forfeiture-for-
competition clause in a partnership agreement between attorneys.
The agreement provided in part:
Should more than one partner, associate or individual
withdraw from the firm prior to age sixty-five (65) and
thereafter within a period of one year practice law... to-
gether or in combination with others including former
partners or associates of this firm, in a practice engaged in
the handling of liability insurance defense work as afore-
said within the Los Angeles or Orange County Court sys-
'tem, said partner or partners shall be subject, at the sole
discretion of the remaining non-withdrawing partners to
forfeiture of all their rights to withdrawal benefits other
than capital as provided for in Article V herein. 44
The appellate court's decision held the agreement unenforceable
as violative of public policy.1 45 The California Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "an agreement among partners imposing a rea-
sonable cost on departing partners who compete with the law firm
... is not inconsistent with rule 1-500 and is not void on its face as
against public policy."1'4
preventing withdrawing attorney from receiving benefits if he or she continued to
practice law violated attorney's right to practice), review denied, 668 P.2d 384 (Or.
1983); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, 811 S.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Tenn. 1991)
(stating agreement that denies withdrawing attorney deferred compensation is
void because it restricts attorney's right to practice). See generally HiLLMAN, supra
note 17.
142. Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848. Subsequently, in Howard v. Babcock, the
California Supreme Court reaffirmed this liberal reading of Rule 1-500 of the Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct. 863 P.2d 150, 156 (Cal. 1993). "We do not
construe rule 1-500 in such a narrow fashion .... The rule does not.., prohibit a
withdrawing partner from agreeing to compensate his former partners .... Such a
construction represents a balance between competing interests." Id.
143. 863 P.2d 150, 151 (Cal. 1993).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 160.
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Like the Haight court, the court in Howard found it unreasona-
ble to distinguish lawyers from other professionals who also owe a
duty of loyalty to their clients. 47 Consequently, the court rejected
the per se approach and expressly stated that it was seeking a bal-
ance between the client's interest in free choice of counsel and the
law firm's interest in a stable business environment. 148 According
to the Howard court, an absolute ban on competition would be per
se impermissible. An agreement that limits competition within a
specific geographic area, however, may be reasonable. 149
B. Equitable Considerations: Unclean Hands
In Haight, the California Court of Appeals refused to consider
the principles of "waiver, unclean hands or in pari delicto." 150
However, a NewJersey Superior Court in Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin
& Marcus 5' applied these basic equitable considerations to a re-
strictive covenant.152 The departing lawyers in Jacob wished to have
the rules of professional conduct interpreted in their favor in order
to void the agreement that denied them termination compensa-
tion.1 53 Relying on the language of Model Rule 5.6, the court
found that the departing attorneys had participated in this agree-
ment as much as the employer-law firm.154 The court concluded
that if the agreement was in fact illegal, both the plaintiffs and the
defendants should bear the burden of illegality equally.1 55 Enrich-




150. Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (Ct.
App. 1991), review denied, No. S020824, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 5862 (Dec. 19, 1991).
The trial court stated that "as a matter of law ... estoppel, waiver, unclean hands
or in pari delicto may not be raised as grounds for enforcement of or to prevent
challenge" to the noncompetition clause. Id.
151. 588 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), rev'd, 607 A.2d 142
(1992).
152. Id. at 1291. The court noted that "it seems that plaintiff's claim should
be barred on basic equitable considerations." Id.
153. Id. The plaintiffs in Jacob were attorneys who had terminated their mem-
bership with the defendant law firm and subsequently brought suit under a service
termination agreement. Id. at 1289. This agreement provided for compensation
only to departing attorneys who rendered no services to clients who were clients of
the defendant firm for one year from the date of termination. Id. at 1290. The
defendant law firm relied on the agreement to deny any termination compensa-
tion. Id. at 1289. Plaintiffs sought to have the agreement interpreted as a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct in order to receive the benefit of compensa-




be as unjust as "enriching the defendant by allowing it to retain
those benefits." 156 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed. 157 The court held the agreement unenforceable as
against public policy because it violated Model Rule 5.6 by restrict-
ing the practice of law. 158 Consequently, plaintiffs were entitled to
the same compensation as departing attorneys whose actions were
noncompetitive. 159
Judge Stuart F. Hancock, Jr., author of the dissenting opinion
in Cohen, echoed the same equitable concerns as the New Jersey
Superior Court in Jacob.160 Judge Hancock wrote that the plaintiff
in Cohen certainly could not in good conscience claim unfairness in
an agreement that he knew of for twenty years. 16 1 Moreover, the
plaintiff himself enjoyed the benefits of the agreement, watching
passively for twenty years as other withdrawing partners lost their
benefits.
16 2
On its face, the equity argument appeals to one's sense of fair-
ness. Adopting this narrow definition of "fair," however, ignores
the client's right to choose an attorney. Beyond the mergers,
breakdowns and general upheaval in the practice of law, the client's
right to freely choose counsel must remain the foremost
consideration. 163
VII. ANALVsis
A. Applying the Balancing Test
In addition to the California decisions in Haight and Howard,
numerous commentators and several dissenting opinions have re-
jected the conventional wisdom of the per se approach of unen-
forceability. 16 4 Instead, they argue that postemployment restrictive
156. Id.
157. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 155 (N.J. 1992).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 414 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock,
J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 415 (Hancock, J., dissenting). According to Judge Hancock, the
majority's invalidation of the agreement constituted "an entirely unwarranted in-
terference with the right of members of a partnership to establish reasonable con-
tractual terms covering the withdrawal of a partner." Id. at 414 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
162. Id. at 415 (Hancock,J., dissenting). As a result, the plaintiff accepted the
benefits of the very agreement he was attempting to invalidate. Id. (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
163. See Cox, supra note 4, at 13, col. 1 (quoting Professor Vincent R.
Johnson).
164. See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995,
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covenants between lawyers should be subject to a balancing test sim-
ilar to that applied to restrictive covenants in other professions.165
The instigators of this legal ethics revolution contend that a court
can determine the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant by appli-
cation of a simple balancing test.166 The test for enforceability, crit-
ics of the per se approach assert, should be reasonableness based
on a balancing of the competing interests.'
6 7
Under the balancing approach, a covenant will not be en-
forced unless it is reasonable. The three prong test articulated in
Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady,'68 provides an archetype for evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a postemployment restrictive covenant. A
covenant "will generally be found to be reasonable where it simply
protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue
hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public."
1 69
Accordingly, a restrictive covenant may be enforced, provided the
employer has a legitimate interest.' 70 For an employer law firm,
such legitimate interests are defined in terms of client confidences,
lost revenue and trade secrets.
1003 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (arguing for more cautious application
of principles espoused in Cohen); Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 412 (Hancock, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing for balancing approach and looking to reasonableness of clause);
HILLMAN, supra note 17, at 26-29 (questioning whether lawyers should be distin-
guished from other professionals); Kalish, supra note 31, at 446 (arguing that law-
yers should be treated like all other professionals); Draper, supra note 4, at 161
(rejecting per se approach in favor of reasonableness test); cf. Getty, supra note 6,
at 244-53 (advocating reasonableness approach to financial forfeiture clauses be-
tween physicians).
165. For further discussion of this argument, see sources cited supra note 164.
166. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) (purporting to
balance "interest of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the interest of law
firms in a stable business environment"); see also Blake, supra note 29, at 653-84
(discussing restrictive covenants); Kalish, supra note 31, at 427-38 (discussing bal-
ancing test as applied to noncompetition clauses between attorneys); Draper, supra
note 4, at 171-79 (advocating balancing approach).
167. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 31, at 456 (criticizing per se approach);
Draper, supra note 4, at 180 (arguing for reasonableness test).
168. 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970).
169. Id.; see also Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d 75, 77
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (adopting reasonableness test articulated in Solan);
Blake, supra note 29, at 648 (discussing test for reasonable covenants); Lowry F.
Kline, Comment, Covenants Not to Compete: The Tennessee Cases, 31 TENN. L. REv.
450, 452-55 (1964) (articulating reasonableness test for covenants not to com-
pete); R. David Lewis, Comment, Contracts in Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants
Not to Compete, 21 ARK. L. REV. 214, 215-18 (1967) (stating test for restrictive
covenants).
170. See Blake, supra note 29, at 627 (outlining viewpoints and interests and
balancing these interests).
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B. Protecting the Law Firm's Interests
1. Client Confidences
The business aspect of lawyering is very similar to any other
service business.171 Unlike many businesses, however, the law firm
has an obligation to protect client confidences.172 The balancing
approach assumes that ethical mandates may be inadequate to safe-
guard these confidences and that a restrictive covenant may, there-
fore, be necessary.' 7
3
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 requires
"[a] lawyer . . . [to] exercise reasonable care to prevent his em-
ployees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client."174 The
parallel Model Rule 1.6(a), states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation." 175 Model Rule 5.1 (a) extends this ob-
ligation to the firm.' 76 Formal Opinion 300 of the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics states that such client confidences are pro-
tected by additional ethical provisions.1 77
Informal Opinion 1301, issued by the ABA Committee on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility focused on a restrictive covenant
between a lawyer and his employer-client. The Committee was
troubled by the agreement, but noted that it was designed to pro-
171. See Kalish, supra note 31, at 438 (discussing business aspects of legal pro-
fession). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 17, at 68-109 (discussing economic con-
cerns of lawyers and law firms).
172. Kalish, supra note 31, at 445-46 (discussing client confidences).
173. Kalish, supra note 31, at 445-46. Professor Kalish argues that client confi-
dences are highly important and that great effort should be taken to protect them.
Id. at 445. Professor Kalish further argues that a restrictive covenant may be a
"reasonable measure to do so." Id. at 446.
174. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101 (1969); see also
Johnson, supra note 4, at 106-08 (discussing use of confidential information).
Johnson notes the fragmented nature of the law of soliciting clients by departing
partners and examines the means by which a firm may attempt to protect itself
from such conduct. Id. at 4-7, 18-110.
175. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
176. See MODEL RuLts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1983). Model
Rule 5.1(a) provides: "A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id.
177. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). The Model
Code and Model Rules contain such provisions. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 4-101 defines "confidence" and sets forth rules on
when use or disclosure of confidential information is or is not appropriate by a
lawyer. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1969). See gener-
ally Johnson, supra note 4, at 106-08 (discussing confidential client information).
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tect the law firm's confidential information. 178 Nevertheless, the
agreement was held not to violate the Model Code. Although the
opinion is unclear, it probably means that agreements, other than
restrictive covenants, "might be appropriate if necessary to protect
client confidences. " 179 Regardless of whether the Committee
would tolerate restrictive covenants, it was noteworthy that the de-
bate centered on the best interests of the client.
2. Lost Revenue and Trade Secrets
Proponents of the balancing test argue that the economic
hardship inflicted on a firm when a partner joins a competitor, jus-
tifies forfeiture of the departure compensation. 8 0 A law firm un-
doubtedly has a legitimate interest in preserving its own economic
security and trade secrets. Nevertheless, a law firm should not be
allowed to protect these interests "by contracting for the forfeiture
of earned revenues during the withdrawing partner's active tenure
and participation."181 Contracts requiring forfeiture of earned rev-
enues constitute an offensive use of postemployment restrictive cov-
enants that may economically cripple a former employee and
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1301 (1975). For a discussion of Informal Opinion 1301 and client confidences,
see Kalish, supra note 31, at 445.
179. See Kalish, supra note 31, at 445 (interpreting ABA Informal Opinion
1301). The most debatable paragraph of Informal Opinion 1301 reads:
This opinion is limited to the consideration of the propriety of the lawyer-
employee signing an agreement containing a covenant restricting future
employment. Agreements may be, in some cases, evidence of the intent
to protect proprietary information entrusted to a lawyer employee which
may be vital to an employer's case where the lawyer's disclosure or
threatened disclosure of a former employer's confidential information to
a competitor involves him and the competitor in a civil action for an in-
junction or damages. The existence of an agreement may serve as evi-
dence which will hasten judicial proscription of such injurious conduct
and may be warranted on that ground.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975).
180. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993) ("[W]hen
partners with a lucrative practice leave a law firm along with their clients, their
departure from and competition with the firm can place a tremendous financial
strain on the firm."); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 145
(N.J. 1992) (finding that financial disincentive clause was not necessary to protect
firm's economic interests); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 412 (N.Y.
1989) (arguing on behalf of defendant that economic hardship justified forfeiture
provision). See generally Kafker, supra note 4, at 58 (asserting that justification for
treating lawyers differently than other professionals becomes less compelling as
lawyering becomes more like business).
181. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 413; see also Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 397 N.E.2d 358, 360-61 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that employer should not be
able to use anticompetition clause offensively).
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impede the client's freedom to choose counsel.' 82
VIII. RECONCILING THE CONFuCT: AD Hoc BALANCING
A. Public Interest
In a strictly commercial setting, a restriction on trade is unen-
forceable if it prejudices the public interest.183 The public has an
interest in receiving the best products and services at the lowest
price. Consequently, any covenant that unnecessarily limits compe-
tition or deprives the public of an individual's services is void.' 84 In
the legal setting, postemployment covenants were once barred as
being unprofessional.' 8 5 Today, however, restrictions on such cove-
nants are predicated on the right of the client to freely choose
counsel.'1
8 6
Despite the current fixation on the client's freedom to choose
counsel, the potential injury to the public, the third prong of the
balancing test, provides the key to reconciling the "per se" and "bal-
ancing" approaches. Prior to the emergence of the balancing test,
covenants not to compete were generally deemed reasonable pro-
vided they were no broader than necessary and caused no substan-
tial injury to the public.'8 7 The modem balancing approach rejects
this two prong test, supplanting it with a balancing test that weighs
182. See Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 412 (reasoning that client should have freedom
of choice); Post, 397 N.E.2d at 360-61 (stating that covenant should not be used to
"economically cripple" former employee).
183. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 206 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Ark.
1947) (stating that restraint of trade is unenforceable if it violates public interest);
Wren v. Pearah, 249 S.W.2d 985, 987 (Ark. 1952) (finding restriction on trade void
as contrary to public-interest). See generally Scrantom & Wilson, supra note 29 (dis-
cussing evolution ofjudicial attitudes toward covenants not to compete and emer-
gence of reasonableness test).
184. Lewis, supra note 169, at 217.
185. For an examination of the development of the law regarding the unen-
forceability of restrictive covenants among attorneys, see supra notes 45-118 and
accompanying text.
186. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 73, at 486. Hazard and Hodes note that
Model Rule 5.6(a) was designed, in part, "to protect lawyers, particularly young
lawyers, from bargaining away their right to open their own offices after they end
an association with a firm or a legal employer." Id. The authors go on to note,
however, that the most important function of Rule 5.6 is in protecting "future
clients against having only a restricted pool of attorneys from which to choose." Id.
187. See, e.g., Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 131 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1911). In Long,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed an employee's contract that contained
a provision not to service the employer's customers during employment and for
two years after termination. The court upheld the contract as being reasonably
necessary to protect the employer's business while not unduly infringing on the
employee's rights. Id. See generally Blake, supra note 30, at 686 (discussing injury to
society from restrictive covenants). For a discussion of the general enforceability
of reasonable restrictive covenants, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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the employer's interest against the burden on the employee.1 88
The third prong of this balancing test, injury to the public, has
been largely ignored. Once a court determines that a restrictive
covenant is reasonable, the court rarely proceeds to consider poten-
tial injury to the public.189 Commentators argue that this is not
surprising because the balancing of competing interests will always
maximize the interests of the parties involved.190
For example, using the California Business and Professions
Code to assert lawyers' status as professionals, the court in Haight,
successfully applied the legitimate business interest and the undue
hardship prongs of the balancing test.19' Yet by de-emphasizing the
monetary penalty for practicing in violation of the agreement, and
broadly interpreting Rule 1-500 of the California Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the California Court of Appeal misinterpreted
the policy considerations for restricting noncompetition clauses. As
a result, the court failed to apply the third prong of the balancing
test-injury to the public. 192 Under the reasoning of the California
Court of Appeal, only "an agreement to refrain altogether from the
practice of law" would render the covenant unenforceable. 93 Such
an interpretation not only violates the spirit of over a half century
188. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 29, at 675-76 (discussing noncompetition
clauses and "balancing the equities" between employer and employee interests);
Kalish, supra note 31, at 435 (discussing balancing test); cf. Getty, supra note 6, at
244 (stating physicians' covenants not to compete must be examined in light of
employers' interests, possibility of undue hardship on employee and likelihood of
harmful effect on public); Draper, supra note 4, at 180 (advocating flexible balanc-
ing test that considers firms' and employees' interests and client choice).
189. Blake, supra note 29, at 686.
190. Id.; see also Kalish, supra note 31, at 456 (suggesting balancing test is best
approach).
191. See Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Ct.
App. 1991) (applying balancing test), review denied No. S020824, 1991 Cal. LEXIS
58621 (Dec. 19, 1991).
192. Id.
193. Id. The court in Haight stated that Rule 1-500 of the California Rules of
Professional Conduct does not prohibit departing attorneys from agreeing to com-
pensate their former partners should such attorneys elect to represent clients pre-
viously represented by their former firm. Id. Likewise, in Howard, the California
Supreme Court argued that a "reasonable" price on competition would not im-
pede the interest of the public in being served by the counsel of their choice.
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993). While conceding as "obvious"
that an absolute ban on competition would be per se unreasonable, the court ap-
proved of an agreement that "merely assesses a toll on competition within a speci-
fied geographic area." Id. This short shrift amounts to no consideration of the
public interest at all because a "mere toll" on competition may, in reality, dissuade
a withdrawing partner from serving a client as surely as would an absolute cove-
nant not to compete.
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of legal ethics jurisprudence, but also fails to recognize the most
important factor in the balancing scheme-the client.
B. Separate But Equal
The California Court of Appeal purports to be balancing the
competing interests, as with a noncompetition agreement in any
other profession. This balancing equation, however, contains only
two factors: the departing attorney and the employer law firm.
19 4
By failing to accord proper weight to the third factor, the client or
injury to the public resulting from the covenant, the California
courts extol the virtues of treating lawyers like all others and then
treats them differently. 195  Moreover, "[w]hen an employer,
through superior bargaining power, extracts a deliberately unrea-
sonable and oppressive noncompetitive covenant he is in no just
position to seek, and should not receive, equitable relief from the
courts." 196 If rulings in the Howard and Haight vein continue, "it
could become routine for big firms to make incoming associates
sign lifelong restrictions on their practice," which would extract sig-
nificant monetary penalties if violated.197 This form of involuntary
servitude cannot be in the client's best interest.
C. Cost-Benefit v. Freedom of Choice
Proponents of the balancing test assert that in an efficient mar-
ket, the social cost of keeping an employee from ajob in which he
or she would be more productive is theoretically equal to the eco-
nomic loss suffered by the individual. 198 Such a cost-benefit analysis
may maximize the marginal utility to society as a whole. The bal-
ancing test, however, fails to recognize the intangible factors em-
bodied in the Model Code and Model Rules. For instance, the test
194. See Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The Haight court balanced only the
interest of the law firm in preserving financial stability following the attorney's
departure with that of the departing attorney in being able to practice law any-
where in California and accept employment from any client wishing to hire him.
Id. at 848. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 160 ("We seek to achieve a balance between the
interest of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the interest of law firms in a
stable business environment."). But see id. at 164-65 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that majority opinion justifies its erosions of client's rights by treating client's
right to choose counsel as " 'theoretical' and inconsistent with 'reality' ").
195. See Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
196. Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970); see also 5 WiLis-
TON, CoNrTRcrs § 1659-1660, at 4682, 4685 (stating that employers possessing su-
perior bargaining power over their employees are precluded from insisting upon
unreasonable and excessive restrictions in noncompetitive covenants because such
covenants will be deemed invalid as oppressive).
197. Cox, supra note 4, at 13, col. 1 (quoting Professor Vincent R. Johnson).
198. Blake, supra note 29, at 687.
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is blind to the personal idiosyncrasies that make a particular lawyer
attractive to a client. Suppose client X prefers lawyer Y simply be-
cause he feels comfortable with her. If lawyer Y departs from the
employer-firm and is expressly prohibited from serving client X, or
dissuaded from doing so through a financial disincentive, then the
restrictive agreement has effectively limited X's access to counsel.
How much weight should be allocated to a client's freedom of
choice?
Merely balancing the interests of the departing attorney and
the employer-law firm relegates the client to the unfortunate status
of merchandise.1 99 Clients, however, are not merchandise. "Law-
yers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but personal ser-
vice. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to be
inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status."200
Public policy, as embodied in the Model Code and Model Rules,
requires that the public have its choice of counsel. 201 Enforcing
199. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 164 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). In Howard, Justice Kennard criticized the majority's emphasis upon the
reasonableness calculus. Justice Kennard asserted that, "the majority ... dimin-
ishes the rights of clients by treating them as no more important than 'the interest
of law firms in a stable business environment.' " Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted). "The majority justifies its erosion of clients' rights... by announc-
ing that the clients' right to select their own attorneys is 'theoretical' and
inconsistent with 'reality.' "Id. at 164-65 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also Cohen v.
Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that lawyers should not
barter in clients); New York County Lawyer's Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 109 (1943) (same); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300
(1961) (finding restrictive covenants in attorney contracts to be unethical despite
lack of express prohibition in Canons of Ethics). The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility codified the reasoning of Formal Opinion 300. MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry DR 2-108(A) (1969). ABA Formal Opinion 300 states:
[A] general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving the
employment, from practicing in the community for a stated period, ap-
pears to this Committee to be an unwarranted restriction on the right of
a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent with our pro-
fessional status. Accordingly, the Committee is of the opinion it would be
improper for the employing lawyer to require the covenant and likewise
for the employed lawyer to agree to it.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300. In 1983, the American Bar
Association promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, which
adopted a similar provision in Model Rule 5.6. For the language of Model Rule
5.6, see text accompanying supra note 72.
200. NewYork County Lawyer's Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 109
(1943).
201. See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 149 (N.J.
1992) ("Because the client's freedom of choice is the paramount interest to be
served by the [Rules of Professional Conduct], a disincentive provision is as detri-
mental to the public interest as an outright prohibition."); Denburg v. Parker Cha-
pin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (asserting that restrictions
against competition are "objectionable primarily because they interfere with cli-
ent's choice of counsel"); Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 410 (asserting public must have
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restrictive covenants that recognize a guaranteed property right to
clients overlooks the most important consideration: the clients'
freedom to choose his or her own counsel.
202
The idea that clients are entitled to be represented by the at-
torney of their choice is firmly rooted in the tradition of our legal
system.203 Lawyers are not commercial business people like ac-
countants and merchants. The practice of law requires clients to
reveal personal and confidential information in the context of the
professional relationship.20 4 The lawyer-client relationship is there-
fore fiduciary as well as confidential. Consequently, the client's
right to freely choose counsel must remain paramount and should
not be burdened.20 5 The client has a vested right to place confi-
dence in the lawyer of his or her choice.20 6 Restrictive covenants
binding the legal profession, which involve unconditional confiden-
tial relationships, can be distinguished from those in a commercial
or business setting, where primarily economic interests are at
stake.20 7 This distinction emphasizes the greater potential for in-
jury to the public when restrictive covenants bind attorneys. Conse-
quently, application of the third prong of the balancing test is even
more important in the legal context.
right to choose counsel); see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op.
300 (restricting client's choice of counsel is unethical).
202. See Cox, supra note 4, at 13, col. 1 (quoting Professor Vincent R.
Johnson).
203. See Marshall v. Romano, 158 A. 751, 752 (NJ. Essex County Ct. 1932)
(discussing propriety of substituting attorneys); see also Howard, 863 P.2d at 161-66
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's argument in favor of protecting cli-
ent's right to retain counsel of choice).
204. See Howard, 863 P.2d at 161 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing that law is
first and foremost profession "with all the responsibilities that [the] word im-
plies"). See generally HAZARD & HODES, supra note 73.
205. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 73, at 822 (discussing covenants not to
compete within legal profession).
206. Id.; see also Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 149
(NJ. 1992) (arguing that clients' freedom of choice is paramount interest to be
protected by prohibitions against covenants not to compete between lawyers).
While a law firm may have a legitimate interest in its own survival, as does any
entity, it cannot protect that interest by restricting a client's choice to retain the
departing attorney as counsel. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413
(N.Y. 1989).
207. Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d 75, 80 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1982). In Edelson, an accounting firm sought injunctive enforcement
of a restrictive covenant against the defendant, its former employee. Id. at 75. The
Superior Court of New Jersey addressed the enforceability of restrictive covenants
among accountants and found that the accountant-client relationship, like the at-
torney-client relationship, is consensual and fiduciary. Id. at 80. Consequently, the
court deemed it inappropriate to prevent the firm's clients from exercising their
free choice to leave the firm and seek the accounting services of the defendant. Id.
The court, however, refused to accept a per se rule of impermissibility. Id.
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According to ethics opinions, the client market can be ethically
divided only through "individual performance and the establish-
ment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fi-
delity to trust."208 Strong public policy principles articulated in the
Code and Rules prohibit the use of restrictive covenants. Because
the restrictive covenants injure the public, they fail to satisfy the
third prong of the reasonableness test.20 9 The first two prongs in
the reasonableness test, although probative, are not conclusive.
The question of reasonableness, when lawyers are involved, neces-
sarily turns on the final prong-injury to the public. If a state
chooses to reject the policies embodied in DR 2-108 and Model
Rule 5.6, the policy arguments that focus on injury to the public
would not exist, leaving just the first two prongs of the balancing
test. Unfortunately, in such states the best interests of the client
and the public will not be adequately safeguarded.
IX. CONCLUSION
For decades, the ethical mandates of lawyering articulated
clear prohibitions against restrictions on the practice of law. In
1910, legal ethics scholar William Archer wrote that "[t]he client
has a sort of pride in exhibiting a well-groomed attorney to his
friends as 'my lawyer.' "210 Although the protocol of lawyering has
changed since Archer's era, one constant remains-a client should
be able to freely choose counsel.
Prior to the 1990s, it was thought that consideration of the cli-
ent's right to choose had become entrenched in legal ethics juris-
prudence. However, the recent California decisions seem to
indicate otherwise. These decisions assert that lawyers should be
treated like all others, and that reasonable restrictive covenants
among attorneys should be enforced. Lawyers, however, are inher-
ently different. This is illustrated by the fiduciary and confidential
implications that arise when the public interest prong of the balanc-
ing test is applied to attorneys. Only through a correct application.
of the balancing test, with full and frank consideration of the cli-
ent's best interest and potential injury to the public, can the ethical
208. Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (citing DR 2-
108 (A) of Preliminary Draft of Code of Professional Responsibility), affd, 348 A.2d
208 (App. Div. 1975). For a list of cases invalidating agreements that, in effect,
treat clients as chattel, see supra note 77.
209. See Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500 (examining injurious effect on public of re-
stricting lawyer's right to practice); see also Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 164
(Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (characterizing enforcement of restrictive
covenant as "erosion of client's rights" in choosing attorney of his or her choice).
210. ARCHER, supra note 78, at 35.
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mandates be reconciled with modern restrictive covenant
jurisprudence.
X. APPENDIX
The following appendix contains the relevant restrictive cove-
nant provisions for a selected group of states. Also, the appendix
includes an interpretive case and an explanatory ethics opinion.
CAuFoRNIA: The California rule governing restrictive covenants
among attorneys, differs from the Model Code and the Model
Rules.211 Rule 1-500 of the California Rules of Professional Con-
duct states in pertinent part:
(A) A member shall not be a party to or participate in
offering or making an agreement, whether in connection
with the settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise, if the agree-
ment restricts the right of a member to practice law, ex-
cept that this rule shall not prohibit such an agreement
which:
(1) Is a part. of an employment, shareholders', or part-
nership agreement among members provided the restric-
tive agreement does not survive the termination of the
employment, shareholder, or partnership relationship; or
(2) Requires payments to a member upon the member's
retirement from the practice of law; or
(3) Is authorized by Business & Professions Code sec-
tions 6092.5, subdivision 1, or 6093.212
In Haight, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Dis-
trict examined the Rule of Professional Conduct providing that an
attorney licensed to practice in California could not be party to an
agreement restricting a member's right to practice law. According
to the court, this rule did not prohibit the withdrawing partner
from agreeing to compensate former partners in the event he chose
to represent clients previously represented by the firm.
2 13
CONNECTICUT: Connecticut adopts the language of Model Rule
5.6.214
211. CALIFORNIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-500 (1992).
212. Id.; see also Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Fitzgerald, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845,
848 (Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S020824, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 58621 (Dec. 19,
1991).
213. Id.
214. See Connecticut State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op.




FLORIDA: Rule 4-5.6 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct is
identical to Model Rule 5.6.215
IOWA: Iowa adopts the language of the Model Code DR 2-108.216
MARYLAND: Rule 5.6 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which governs restrictions on an attorney's right to practice
law, adopts the language of the Model Rule 5.6.217 Maryland had
allowed agreements between attorneys that
include a provision for dividing fees between the firm and
the lawyer in the event that the lawyer would leave the
firm and represent a former client of the firm and also a
provision that prohibits the lawyer from discussing with
the client the circumstances of his termination from the
law firm. 21
8
NEW YoRK: The state of New York has adopted the language of the
Model Code.
219
PENNSYLVANIA: Pennsylvania's Rules of Professional Conduct are
based on the Model Rules.
220
TEXAS: Texas has adopted a modified version of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Texas equivalent to Model Rule 5.6,
Texas State Bar Rule 5.06, contains an exception that permits a re-
strictive covenant to be part of a settlement in a disciplinary pro-
215. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-5.6 (1993).
216. IowA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 2-108
(1993); see also Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 1990) (finding client's choice to follow departing attorney
did not justify suspension of contractual agreement to former partner); Iowa State
Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op. 89-48 (1990) (stating law
firm may not prevent lawyer from soliciting clients for two years).
217. MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1991); see also
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 572 A.2d 510, 516 (Md. 1990) (citing prohibition
in Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 against noncompetition agreements
between attorneys); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833, 844 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988) (same).
218. Maryland State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics, Op. 89-29 (1989).
According to the Committee, such an agreement, does not restrict a client from
retaining a departing partner as counsel. Id.
219. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
§ 1200.13 (1990) (adopting boiler plate language of Model Code of Professional
Responsibility); see also Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410 (N.Y.
1989) (relying on Code of Professional Responsibility and refusing to enforce for-
feiture-for-competition clause of partnership agreement).
220. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Op. 88-249 (undated) (stating law firm cannot create employment
contract that requires departing attorney to pay law firm 50% of fees received from
pirated client).
814 [Vol. 39: p. 773
1994] AN ATroRN"s DILEMMA
ceeding against a lawyer.221 Recently, article 10, section 9 of the
State Bar Rules (Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct)
was adopted and former article 10, section 9 of the State Bar Rules
(Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) was repealed, effective
January 1, 1990.222
VIRGINIA: Virginia DR 2-106 traces the language of Model Code DR
2-108.22S
221. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.06 (1991).
222. SeeTEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. art. 10, § 9 (West 1991); see also Musselwhite v.
State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437, 443-44 (Tex. 1990) (stating disciplinary rule
prohibiting lawyer from entering into settlement agreement that restricts right to
practice law did not apply to judgment in disciplinary action where attorney was
prohibited from soliciting new clients for specific amount of time); State Bar of
Tex. Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 459 (1988) (stating that postemployment re-
strictive covenant between associate and law firm employer violates rules based on
Model Code); cf State Bar of Tex. Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 466 (1990)
(upholding retirement exception).
223. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY DR 2-106 (1991); see also
Virginia State Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1232 (1989) (invali-
dating employment agreement containing covenant not to compete for three
years); Virginia State Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 880 (1987)
("A professional corporation may implement an unqualified deferred compensa-
tion plan which restricts a retiring or withdrawing employee lawyer from practicing
law within a reasonable radius from the law firm. The Code prohibits agreements
which restrict a lawyer's right to practice law, unless such agreement is a condition
to payment of retirement benefits."). See generally Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of
Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 259, 265, 267-86 (1985) (discussing
Model Code and Model Rules as they apply to law firm associates and law firms).

